

Specifically, 'other' cultures, expressed by individuals' view of the planning process and the built environment, are immediately seen foreign and strange. Participants react to 'strange' behaviors of some members, thus revealing the stresses with their conventions and with the framing of issues and plans. Usually, the instinctive as well as calculated reaction to strangeness is closing up openness. MacCallum points at a wide array of behaviors, from linguistic choices to strategies of argumentation and bargaining, expressing participants' tendency to introvert and retreat from active participation. Similarly, her analysis manifests that acknowledging the cultural-gap is an essential step towards resolution as it is for creating a productive atmosphere in participatory sessions.

Nevertheless, MacCallum's book do not pretend to provide a closed set of tools let alone a procedure for resolving tensions and disentangling conflicts in participatory planning. Moreover, the book clearly shows that to some extent, unresolved tensions are an inevitable part of participatory planning and cannot be escaped. This is a shaking argument, especially since the scholarly discourse of the 1990s, affected by Habermasian ideas of deliberative processes, created an expectation for participatory planning ending with relatively stable consensuses. Unfortunately, MacCallum's book is not interested in theorizing these findings and discussing possible impacts on planning and on protecting the public interest. To my view, this is an interesting point that still needs to be discussed. On the other hand, interesting CDA tools offered in the book can help researchers analyzing the impact of cultural gaps and a-symmetric power distribution on the dynamics of the participatory process. I therefore expect the book to be useful to scholars dealing with public participation, planning discourse analysis and dynamics of plan-making, and to students in the field.

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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND URBAN GROWTH IN CHINA, by  
Lei Wang. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2011.

The transformation of the Chinese economy that resulted from Deng Xiao-ping's 1978 Four Modernizations Program has not only resulted in unprecedented growth of the overall Chinese economy and per capita income, but also a radically changed urban landscape. No longer are Chinese cityscapes drab imitations of Soviet-style cities based on poured cement construction. Instead they feature sky-scrapers, large modern condominium apartment complexes, malls, subways, freeways, and recreational facilities reminiscent of vibrant economic centers found throughout the world. Wang's thin volume, consisting of 137 pages including an index and bibliog-

raphy, explicates the role that foreign direct investment (FDI) played in this urban transformation.

Wang's presentation is spread over an introduction, five substantive chapters, and a conclusion. There are four issues that permeate his discussion. First, there is the issue of data, including the measurement of FDI, and the impact FDI has had on industrial output, tax revenues, and exports. The important distinction between contracted and utilized (realized) FDI inflows is carefully analyzed. Data comparing the rate of FDI in China with various developed and developing countries are incorporated into the analysis. FDI are broken down by broad sectors (real estate, manufacturing, other). Other key variables considered include changes in average land prices by end use (commercial, residential and industrial) as well as fixed assets of FDI firms.

For the most part Wang compares the absolute change in each measure under consideration. In so doing he frequently underestimates the full impact of FDI, something that could have been remedied by calculating percentage changes. This calculation can be done by the reader since Wang has included the raw data in his tables. Wang's method of data analysis also fails when he seeks to describe regional differences in FDI. Although the bibliography includes all the key, recent, geographic works on FDI in China, Wang deviates from this literature in two ways. First, instead of analyzing the spatial patterns of FDI across major cities and the 27 Chinese provinces, he uses the three mega-regions developed in 1986 as a part of China's regional scheme for national development. Second, his tables on regional difference are sparse and include only the data for the provinces or cities within each mega-region with the maximum and minimum impact of FDI. In the end the reader does not have a good sense of either what the spatial distribution of FDI is, or how FDI by source or end use has been concentrated across China.

A second issue Wang addresses is how the changing nature of China's budgeting system created a need for provinces and cities to attract FDI. Before 1980, tax revenues were collected and expended in a highly centralized fashion. There was limited revenue sharing between central and provincial governments, and any surpluses left over from central government allocations to provinces could not be retained at the local level. In 1980 it was realized that letting sub-national governments have greater flexibility over revenues and expenditures had the potential for increasing economic growth. So a "fiscal responsibility system" based upon four categories of revenues—central fixed, local fixed, shared revenue at a fixed ratio, and adjustable revenues—was established. Its application was not uniform across all provinces and cities: Jiangsu province and Beijing, Shanghai, and Tientsin would continue to pool and share all tax revues with the central governments; minority-majority provinces and autonomous areas were to be allowed to retain all revenues, while provinces with special economic zones (designed to attract foreign investment) were given wider fiscal latitude in remitting or receiving central government funding. The reforms, formally termed the Sichuan Model after a similar 1979 trial fiscal reform

program conducted in that province in China's southwest, involved a change in how state own enterprises would be taxed. In 1988 the categories of revenues to be shared were further expanded from four to six.

By 1994 it became evident that the Sichuan model had failed, since the central government did not see an increase in two key fiscal measures: the ratio of budgetary revenues to GDP and that of central budgetary revenues to the national total. A new reform then divided government revenues into three basic categories—central, local, and shared—covering some 19 different types of taxes. The net result of this reform was that local governments were forced to generate new revenues from the one resource they unequivocally controlled—land. This gave rise to the notion of entrepreneurial local states.

A third issue Wang deals with then is how local governments actually used their land resources to attract FDI and generate new revenues. Land for redevelopment was derived from several sources: areas deemed to be in need of urban development, vacant land, and agricultural land within the city limits due to previous deliberate over-bounding of cities. Once specific parcels of land were identified for development it then would be allocated to a number of possible land use categories: residential, office, commerce/service, manufacturing/storage, public facilities, and transportation. The residential sector was further subdivided into ordinary, luxury, and affordable housing. The pricing of each category was designed to attract developers and investors who would provide new housing and centers attractive to tertiary, quaternary, and quinary activities, as well as attract new manufacturing enterprises. As such through a combination of market forces and state intervention the price of land for industrial use stayed relatively low and stable, while the prices for commercial and residential land were allowed to increase. There is an inverted logic to this system: urban bureaucrats saw the manufacturing sector as a more reliable engine of long term growth and revenue than the real estate sector. Yet Wang is forced to conclude that in addition to generating new housing, this approach to urban land use pricing created a situation where the growth of the Chinese economy is increasingly dependent upon the health of the real estate sector.

Finally, Wang links his issues so as to focus on the history of how urban housing has been supplied in China since 1949 and why DFI for housing was necessary. Before 1978, some 60 percent of urban housing units were provided by state operated enterprises as part of the socialist welfare scheme. The remainder of urban housing was developed by local governments as public housing for workers not eligible for state enterprise units or those that could not afford to build by themselves. Under Deng's reforms the urban housing market was subject to the processes of commercialization and marketization. Where possible, workers were encouraged to buy their housing units; when this was not feasible the state subsidized rents. Speculators would buy housing units thereby putting a strain on the supply of housing. An additional sources of strain on housing availability were natural population

growth and migration to cities. Given budgetary constraints, DFI was the most obvious source of new sources of housing,

Manuscripts sent to Ashgate for publication are supposed to be in copy-edited, camera ready format. This was not entirely the case for the volume under review. For example, the author appears not to be a native speaker of English and at times his use of colloquial expressions involves inaccurate use of vocabulary. Second, there is a lot of duplication and overlap between chapters, hence this review did not follow the usual chapter by chapter summary of the book's content. Finally, the author is somewhat disingenuous in his discussion of the sources of land available for urban development. His discussion of what appear to be unfair, unjust, and corrupt land appropriations from householders and landlords is minimal. That buildings and neighborhoods that are unsightly, even when they are of historic interests, get condemned and torn down in the name of urban renewal is not mentioned. Revitalization and/or gentrification are rarely used as mechanisms for urban redevelopment and are not considered. The treatment of farmers is somewhat more comprehensive, including the observation that the actual compensation farmers actually receive is usually less than the maximum allowed by regulation, namely thirty times the value of the annual agricultural output of the land being taken. It could be argued that this issue is beyond the scope of the book. However, the land acquisition process is frequently associated with disrupted lives, severed social networks, and the loss of livelihood as urban development results in urban displacement. Such displacement is an integral part of the evolving Chinese urban landscape and merit at least some mention in any volume dealing with any aspect of China's new urbanization.

These criticisms aside, Wang's text provides a succinct and useful overview of the role foreign direct investment has played in transforming the urban landscape in China over the past several decades.

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DEVELOPMENT TOURISM: LESSONS FROM CUBA, by Rochelle Spencer.  
Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010.

This book explores many of the major issues of tourism and development in third world countries by examining the case of Cuba. It is inspired by the author's PhD dissertation on the convergence of development and tourism in Cuba.

The book comprises an introduction and three parts, each of which has two chapters. Much of the introduction is not just an introduction to the book, but rather to Cuba itself. This is very helpful as many readers presumably do not know much about Cuba. This generates trust between the writer (Spencer), who 'guides'